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Emotions are likely to be produced when two or more people exchange valued outcomes 
(i.e., goods, rewards, payoffs). Emotions are internal events that occur within an actor and that 
stem from conditions or events external to the actor (e.g., the behavior of others, results of 
exchange, social context). These may take various forms, including general feelings of 
pleasure/satisfaction or displeasure/dissatisfaction or more specific feelings of anger, shame, 
pride, gratitude, and so forth. It is reasonable to presume that any emotions felt by actors due to 
their exchange could have important effects on their future exchanges and their relationships. For 
example, if the exchanges make them feel good or feel gratitude toward each other, their 
inclination to exchange should increase and they may develop a stronger relationship over time. 
On the other hand, if they feel anger or shame after concluding an exchange, their inclination to 
exchange in the future should decrease and a relationship may not develop at all. This chapter 
reviews theoretical and empirical work bearing on how and when emotions or feelings from 
social exchange affect the development and strength of social relations and groups. 
One would not expect to find a large amount of work on emotion within social exchange 
theorizing, given the underlying assumptions of this tradition. Social exchange theories assume 
an instrumental view of actors (i.e., they are self-interested and oriented to increasing if not 
maximizing rewards) and of social units (i.e., relations and groups form and persist because they 
provide rewards or protect against punishments). Two guiding principles are as follows: (a) 
behaviors that generate rewarding consequences for the actor are repeated; and (b) actors stay in 
relations and groups from which they receive rewards that are comparatively better than rewards 
available elsewhere (e.g., Emerson 1972a; Molm and Cook 1995; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). 
Relations, groups, and larger social units are means for generating individual rewards (Hechter 
1987), not ends in themselves. An important implication is that, in social exchange theory, social 
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units (relations, groups, organizations) are precarious and unstable, because members come and 
go as changes occur in structural opportunities, incentives, values, or preferences. This makes 
social order at the microlevel or macrolevel problematic because it is contingent on stable 
structures and incentives that motivate and shape repetitive patterns of behavior and interaction. 
We propose that emotional processes in exchange can “solve” this social order problem by 
generating affective attachments to social units, rendering those units salient and objects of value 
in their own right. 
There are currently two microfoundations for social exchange theorizing, each reflecting 
a different variation on the above instrumental theme: reinforcement or operant theory (Emerson 
1972a; Homans 1961) and rational-choice theory (Elster 1986; Molm and Cook 1995; Wilier 
1999). An important difference between these two microfoundations is that, in a reinforcement 
framework, actors are assumed to “look backward” (i.e., orient their behavior to past 
experience), whereas in a rational-choice framework, actors are assumed to “look forward” (i.e., 
orient their behavior to future states of affairs or goals) (see Macy 1993). Exchange theories 
typically are built on one or both of these metatheoretical frameworks, implicitly or explicitly. 
Interestingly, based on some psychological theory and research (Izard 1991), “looking 
backward” and “looking forward” produce distinct emotional responses—looking backward may 
produces joy and comfort, whereas looking forward may produces interest and excitement. Thus, 
these different temporal perspectives (backward or forward) may have different consequences 
for relations and groups based on social exchange. 
Exchange-theoretic actors are decidedly unemotional or emotionally vacuous (Lawler 
and Thye 1999). In exchange theory, actors process information, interpret others’ intentions, and 
respond to rewards, but the fact that they also emote is generally neglected in the literature (see 
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Homans, 1950, for a notable exception). One obvious reason for this neglect is that exchange 
theorists generally are inclined to eschew “internal states” in lieu of structural and behavioral 
explanations (Emerson 1972a, 1972b; Wilier 1999). Cognitive notions of risk and trust have 
been borrowed from psychology and economics (e.g., Cook 2001; Molm 1997; Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi 1994) and used mainly to round out and deepen instrumental explanations of 
behavior. Yet, even here there are potentially relevant emotions, such as fear, confidence, 
gratitude, or anger, that could be important to understanding risk and trust. The purpose of this 
chapter is to theorize emotions in social exchange, develop the implications for relations and 
groups, and selectively review empirical literature. 
 
THE PROBLEM 
 
The core problem addressed by this chapter is to examine and explain the “order-
producing” effects of emotions in social exchange. We assume that a social structure is the prime 
context within which actors may or may not exchange; exchange is voluntary and actors engage 
in a process of interaction that may or may not produce an exchange. We posit that individuals 
respond emotionally to the “results” of a social exchange (i.e., to the fact of exchange and to the 
rewards received). The emotions involve general positive or negative feelings—“feeling good” 
or “feeling bad.” Key issues include how and when such feelings are produced by social 
exchange, and how and when individually felt emotions generate affective attachments to their 
relational or group affiliations. Person-to-group attachments would produce greater order and 
stability, because actors then would be more likely to stay in the relation or group, develop a 
collective orientation that moderates narrow self-interest, and trust others within the relation or 
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group. Person-to-unit ties with an affective basis transform relations or groups into expressive 
objects of value in and of themselves. 
 
A Social Formations Approach 
 
In an earlier paper, Lawler and Thye (1999) analyzed a wide range of theoretical ideas 
that can be applied to emotions in social exchange. The purpose was to explore different points 
or places where emotions are important. Some of these ideas were from social exchange theory; 
however, most were from other areas of sociology and psychology. More specifically, Lawler 
and Thye offered a framework that identifies three junctures in social exchange at which 
emotions play an important role: (1) as integral elements of the social context of social exchange; 
(2) as features of the processes of exchange; and (3) as results of the outcomes of social 
exchange. Social context theories analyze norms about what emotions to feel or express in a 
given situation (Hochschild 1979, 1983), and why status/power differentiation generates 
different emotional responses from higher and lower power or status actors (Kemper 1978, 1987; 
Ridgeway and Johnson 1990). Process-oriented theories emphasize the signaling effects of 
emotions—to self (Heise 1987) and to others (Frank 1988)—and how emotions modify 
cognitions (Bower 1991; Isen 1987). Outcome- oriented theories examine the emotional effects 
of achieving an exchange and the impact of these emotions on personal commitment (Molm 
2003a) or commitment to the relation or group itself (Lawler et al. 2000; Lawler and Yoon 
1996). Lawler and Thye (1999) refer to the latter as the “social formations” approach because it 
addresses the conditions under which social exchanges create, sustain, or undermine Social 
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formations or social units. The larger issue is to understand how social exchange contributes to 
the creation of social order (Lawler 2002). 
This chapter emphasizes and elaborates the social formations approach—in particular, 
when and how emotional responses to outcomes of social exchange strengthen or weaken 
relations and groups. Because of this focus, the chapter should not be interpreted as a 
comprehensive review but, rather, a selective treatment of emotions, focused on our own line of 
research over the past 10-15 years (Lawler 2001, 2002, 2003; Lawler and Thye 1999; Lawler et 
al. 2000; Lawler and Yoon 1993,1996,1998; Thye et al. 2002). This focus also reflects the fact 
that whereas emotions play different roles at different junctures in exchange (see Lawler and 
Thye 1999), social exchange is fundamentally an outcome-oriented theory. If we can show that 
exchange outcomes produce emotions and these emotions affect order (i.e., cohesion, 
commitment, and solidarity) in relations and groups, this adds an important dimension to extant 
exchange theorizing. Because emotions can be associated with different social objects (e.g., self, 
other, relation, group), we need to explain when emotions are attached to social units whether the 
social unit is a relationship, group, network, organization, community, or society. 
 
Concept of Emotion 
 
A standard definition of emotions is that they are positive or negative evaluative states 
with physiological, neurological, and cognitive components (Izard 1991). Emotions are internal 
states of the human organism, reflecting the organism’s response to external stimuli. The 
neurological correlates are homeostatic mechanisms often ascribed to the evolutionary adaptation 
of the species (Pinker 1997; Turner 2000). Damasio (1999) made an important distinction 
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between “feelings” and “feeling feelings.” The former entail neurological states of the organism, 
wired, learned, and unconscious; the latter are feelings that the individual is aware of in some 
minimal sense, at least aware of their bodily organism’s response (i.e., the feeling of a feeling). 
A unique feature of emotions is that they induce organismwide neurological effects (e.g., 
Damasio et al. 2000); that is, emotions activate chemical secretions that produce organismwide 
states. When an actor feels good, she feels good all over; when an actor feels bad or depressed, 
she feels bad all over. In part because of this, Damasio argued that “feeling feelings” is the most 
fundamental basis for consciousness—in particular the sense of a distinction between the internal 
states of the person as an organism (now felt) and stimuli external to the person (external 
environment). In this sense, the experience of feelings implies a rudimentary sense of self, 
juxtaposed to the external objects or events that are emotion-producing (Damasio 1999). 
This chapter makes a case for treating emotions as central features of social exchange 
(i.e., as a third microfoundation, along with reinforcement and rational choice). Recent research 
of neuroscientists adds empirical weight to this point of view. There is strong evidence that 
elements central to social exchange theory (i.e., rewards and punishments) produce emotional 
counterparts (i.e., neurological or chemical manifestations) in the human brain. Rewarding 
stimuli activate certain emotional regions of the brain, and the regions of the brain activated by 
rewards versus punishments are different (e.g., Blood and Zatorre 2001; Damasio 1999; Damasio 
et al. 2000; Small et al. 2001). Damasio et al. (2000) observed different brain activation patterns 
for feelings of happiness and sadness and suggested that the subjective feeling of an emotion by 
an actor is correlated with changing internal states within the brain. Ashby et al. (1999) also 
showed that both reward and positive affect generate dopamine secretions in particular regions of 
the brain, and these secretions enhance cognitive flexibility, such as the capacity to look at 
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stimuli from different perspectives. Negative affect, in turn, is mediated by different neural 
pathways and fosters less cognitive flexibility. By implication, if rewards and punishments 
generate emotional responses that impact neurological pathways in such fundamental ways, it is 
reasonable to argue that emotions and feelings are as central to social exchange as behaviors and 
cognitions are. It is also reasonable to propose that emotions have distinguishable effects on 
social formations, apart from other internal states (cognitions). 
 
SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORIES: BACKGROUND 
 
Homans (1950, 1961) offered the first systematic social exchange theory, and the first to 
include emotion in a systematic way. In Homans’s (1950) work on the human group, he 
theorized that any social context can be analyzed in terms of what activities are undertaken, how 
often interaction occurs between or among given individuals, and what sentiments develop 
among those that interact frequently. Sentiment here refers to “internal states of the human 
body,” including affection, sympathy, antagonism, and liking/disliking. The focus is solely 
interpersonal, person-to-person rather than person-to-unit, sentiments. Homans used interaction 
frequency and sentiments (emotions) to explain the formation and strength of social relations. An 
external context or structure generates activities (e.g., tasks) within which individuals interact 
regularly; more frequent interaction tends to generate positive sentiments between the actors 
(interpersonal), and this underlies the strength of their relationship. In the Human Group, 
Homans (1950) placed an interaction-to- emotion-to-relation process at the center of his 
analysis, and this is an important backdrop for recent work on exchange and emotion (see Lawler 
2006). To him, task activity, self, and other are the primary social objects. To us, social units also 
Social Exchange Theory        9 
 
are important objects in exchange contexts and processes. We subscribe to Parsons’s (1951) view 
that person-to-person and person-to-unit ties are fundamental to questions about social order. 
In Homans’ (1961, 1974) later work, he reinterpreted interaction and its effects on 
sentiment in reinforcement (operant psychology) terms. The focus turned to how rewards that A 
gives to B shape B’s behavior in social interaction or exchange and vice versa (see also Emerson 
1972a). Here, sentiments refer to “spontaneous” emotional responses that are felt immediately as 
a result of reinforcement or punishment. If repeated, they produce consistent patterns of behavior 
and can be interpreted in the context of the other more basic behavioral propositions (see 
Homans 1961, 1974; Lawler 2006). As part of his theoretical framework, Homans offered an 
“aggression- approval proposition” indicating that rewards or punishments, if unexpected, 
produce pleasure and anger. The “if unexpected” provision reflects the fact that these emotional 
responses are particularly useful to account for unusual circumstances or exceptions, rather than 
being at the center of his propositional framework. In operant-psychology terms, external 
reinforcements and punishments generally are sufficient to explain behavior, and sentiments or 
emotions are generally epiphenomenal. We adopt the idea that emotions are internal rewards and 
punishments, a view echoed by more recent work of psychologists (Izard 1991; Stets 2003), but 
we treat emotions as distinct stimuli, rather than subsuming them under standard rubrics of 
external reinforcement or punishment (see Damasio 1999). 
The most precise of early exchange theories was offered by Thibaut and Kelley (1959). 
The theory focuses on dyads and suggests that social comparisons guide exchange behaviors. It 
presumes that individuals evaluate a dyadic relationship against an internal standard called a 
comparison level (CL) and, further, that individuals assess the attractiveness of other potential 
relations by comparing their focal relationship to the benefits expected from others (𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴). 
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Consistent with Homans’ focus on reward contingencies, the theory defines the power of actor A 
over B as A’s ability to affect the quality of outcomes attained by B. There are two ways that this 
can occur. Fate control exists when actor A affects actor B’s outcome by changing her (A’s) 
own behavior, independent of B’s action. For example, if B is more heavily rewarded when A 
chooses one behavior over another, then A has fate control over B. Behavior control exists when 
the rewards obtained by B are a joint function of both A’s and B’s behavior. In either case, 
whether A has fate control or behavior control, B is dependent on A for valued rewards and, 
thus, A has some power over B. Other exchange theories that emerged during that same time 
frame echo the importance of social comparison, valued goods, and dependence. Emotions were 
simply not part of the theoretical landscape. 
A major theoretical shift occurred in the early 1970s, with the development of Emerson’s 
power dependence theory (Emerson 1972a, 1972b). Unlike previous theorists, Emerson cast 
exchange processes in broader terms. He put forth the notion that relations between actors are 
part of a larger set of potential exchange relations (i.e., an exchange network). Thus, in analyzing 
a dyad, he asserted that it is important to consider its broader connection to other dyads—-the 
larger network in which it is embedded. Emerson considered two kinds of connection. A 
negative connection exists when interaction in one dyad reduces interaction in another. A 
positive connection exists when interaction in one dyad promotes interaction in another. The 
focus on connectedness across dyadic sets gave Emerson’s theorizing a decidedly structural 
theme; his were network-embedded dyads. 
As with other exchange theorists of the time, dependence is the centerpiece of Emerson’s 
theory (Emerson 1972b). He coined his approach “power dependence theory” and anchored this 
theory in operant psychology (see Emerson 1972a), relying heavily on the concepts of reward 
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and cost. The key assumption of the theory claims that the power of actor A over actor B is equal 
to the dependence of B on A, summarized by the equation 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. In turn, dependence is a 
function of two factors: the availability of alternative exchange relations and the extent to which 
the actors value those relations. To illustrate, imagine a computer manufacturer (A) that must 
purchase specialized parts from a dealer (B). When the needed parts are not widely available 
from other suppliers, but computer manufacturers are abundant, then A is more dependent on B 
than B is on A (𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) due to availability. When the manufacturer values parts more than 
the supplier values customers, then again A is more dependent on B (𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴). In both cases, 
the theory predicts B has power over A. Emotions, in power dependence theory, simply would be 
the by-product of the rewards and costs incurred by individuals as they exchange with others. 
 
Nature of Social Exchange 
 
In the most general sense, there are three kinds of relation at the heart of exchange theory, 
defined by the kinds of sanctions transmitted in each (Wilier 1999). A sanction is simply any 
action transmitted from one individual and received by another that has positive or negative 
consequences. Conflict exists when A and B each transmit negative sanctions (e.g., when 
disgruntled lovers insult each other). Coercion occurs when a negative sanction (or threat 
thereof) is transmitted for a positive sanction (e.g., as when a loan shark threatens bodily harm to 
induce repayment). Exchange occurs when A and B mutually transmit positive sanctions (e.g., I 
mow the yard, you do the dishes). An exchange relation exists when two individuals repeatedly 
transmit positive sanctions within a larger context of opportunities and constraints (Emerson 
1972b; Wilier 1999). Structures and interdependencies set the stage for exchange transactions by 
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shaping who can exchange with whom and by incorporating incentives that make some 
exchanges likely to yield better payoffs than others. At issue is whether to transact and in what 
amounts. 
Social exchanges are transactions in a network that have relational consequences. Figure 
13.1 captures the fundamental sequence assumed by contemporary social exchange theorizing. 
Social structures generate a set of interdependencies among actors, and these interdependences 
are the basis for who actually exchanges with whom and on what terms. The structure and 
interdependencies instantiate the opportunities and incentives for exchange, and the patterns of 
repeated exchange indicate what exchange relations actually form and are likely to be sustained 
as long as the structurally based opportunities and incentives remain constant (e.g., Cook and 
Emerson 1978; Markovsky et al. 1988; Wilier 1999). 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
 
Social exchange is inherently a joint task. This point is implied by the role of 
interdependence in exchange theories (Emerson 1972b; Thibaut and Kelley 1978). Homans’ 
(1950) concept of “activities” as a fundamental dimension in interaction or group settings 
implicitly poses the issue of how joint are the activities in which individuals engage. Examples 
of joint tasks are a merger of two organizations, two parents deciding how to raise a child, or a 
homeowners association deciding whether to undertake the repair of common property. 
Exchanges occur presumably because doing something jointly with another is likely to yield 
better rewards or payoffs than acting alone or not acting at all. Although all exchange—or social 
interaction, for that matter—entails a degree of jointness, this varies with the social structure. An 
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important theoretical question for us is: What structural conditions vary the degree of jointness in 
the exchange tasks? We argue that emotions generate “order-producing” consequences, 
especially when exchange tasks are high in jointness. 
 
 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
 
 
The theoretical and empirical works reviewed in subsequent pages are guided by three 
orienting ideas or assumptions. First, social exchange is inherently a joint task in which actors 
have a common focus and engage in a “shared” activity (Lawler 2001, 2002). This is implicit in 
most social exchange theorizing (Emerson 1972b; Homans 1961; Thibaut and Kelley 1959; 
Wilier 1999). Second, joint activities generate or amplify emotional responses (e.g., uplift or 
excitement/enthusiasm from doing things jointly with others, from affirming a common identity 
or affiliation, or from achieving some success with others). Durkheim (1915) suggested this in 
his analysis of religious ritual, and Collins (1981) developed the idea further in his theory of 
“interaction ritual chains.” Third, the emotions that individuals experience as a result of a joint 
task are likely to be perceived as jointly produced. This makes relational or group affiliations a 
prospective source or cause of the emotions felt. These orienting ideas suggest some additions to 
the structure-interdependence-exchange process (see Figure 13.1) underlying standard exchange 
theory formulations. Figure 13.2 shows the modifications. The implications of Figure 13.2 are as 
follows: (1) Interaction or exchange has emotional effects on individual actors; (2) the emotions 
affect the strength of their group affiliations or attachments; and (3) these group affiliations are 
the context for structures that generate interdependencies (joint tasks) and patterns of exchange 
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in the future. The next section presents a framework for theorizing emotions and emotional 
processes. 
 
EMOTION AND EMOTIONAL PROCESSES 
 
Emotional states, at the level of immediate experience, are not under the control of actors. 
They essentially “happen to people” (Hochschild 1983). However, once they happen, other 
social processes begin to emerge. If the emotions are positive, presumably actors wish to repeat 
the experience; if they are ambiguous, people interpret their meaning for self, other, and the 
situation. The experience of emotions also has a social and cultural component, beyond the 
neurological bases or correlates, which leads to a number of difficult conceptual issues: Are 
some emotions more fundamental than others? Are some universal and some cultural? When are 
emotions socially constructed and when are they innate? How do emotional expressions connect 
to the underlying internal states (feelings)? These issues have been subjected to considerable 
dialogue and debate in psychology and sociology (e.g., Hochschild 1983; Izard 1991; Kemper 
1978, 1987; Lutz 1988; Schachter and Singer 1962; Scheff 1990; Scherer 1984; Watson et al. 
1984). 
One approach of psychologists has been to conceptualize and measure emotions with 
reference to the words people use to interpret or describe their own feelings and those of others 
(see Lawler and Thye 1999). This “psychometric approach” has assessed whether there are a 
small number of fundamental, distinct dimensions or emotion categories that capture the feeling 
states underlying the variety of words actors used to describe themselves and others in given 
contexts or situations. The “circumplex model” arranges the universe of emotion words on a 
Social Exchange Theory        15 
 
circle around two cross-cutting (perpendicular) bipolar dimensions: pleasure/displeasure and the 
level of arousal (high/low) (see Russell et al. 1989; Watson et al. 1984). The form and intensity 
of the emotions is contingent on where they are located around this circle. There is substantial 
empirical evidence in support of such a formulation, although differences remain on how best to 
characterize or define the dimensions, especially the arousal dimension (Haslam 1995; Larsen 
and Diener 1992; Russell 1980, 1983). One implication is that although many different 
languages, words, or concepts are used by human actors to describe their emotional experiences, 
these boil down to a few underlying dimensions (see Heise, 1987, for a three-dimensional 
solution). 
An alternative approach to emotions, “differentiated emotions theory,” questions the 
premise that emotions are continuous or dimensional in favor of the view that they are discrete, 
discontinuous, and differentiated qualitatively (Clore et al. 1987; Ekman 1980; Izard 1991; 
Kemper 1987; Wierzbicka 1992). Anger is qualitatively different from sadness, happiness or joy 
from excitement, and so forth. For example, sets of qualitatively different emotions tend to 
include the following: fear/anxiety, joy/pleasure/happiness, sadness/depression, anger, and 
shame (e.g., Izard 1991; Kemper 1987). With the circumplex model, anger and fear are similar, 
but a differentiated model takes into account the fact that anger and fear often lead to very 
different behaviors (i.e., fight versus flight). Some research also indicates that different emotions 
activate different degrees of action readiness (Frijda 1986), and this also tends to support the 
differentiated model or theory of emotions. 
Based on the evidence, it is not possible to claim that one approach is necessarily better 
or more accurate than the other. The intensity and type of emotions, as experienced, may fall 
along two or three dimensions as proposed by the circumplex model; and, at the same time, 
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different emotions may produce different types of behavioral responses, as proposed by the 
differentiated model. The choice of approach is contingent on the theoretical or research problem 
to be addressed. For our theoretical purposes, we have developed a simple scheme for analyzing 
emotions in social exchange, borrowing both from the circumplex and differentiated models, as 
well as Weiner’s (1986) “attribution theory of emotion.” 
From Weiner’s (1986) formulation, we theorize a distinction between global emotions or 
feelings (Weiner terms these “primitive”) and specific emotions (see Lawler 2001). Global 
emotions are positive or negative internal states produced by task activity and task success. 
These emotions entail immediate, involuntary responses and take the form of “feeling good” or 
“feeling bad.” According to Weiner, these global or primitive emotions do not involve cognitive 
interpretations or emotion attributions. Specific emotions, in contrast, arise from the experience 
of the primitive or global feelings and are mediated by cognition or attribution (Weiner 1986). 
Weiner provided a useful way to distinguish immediate, automatic, nonvoluntary emotional 
responses from those that are stimulated by cognitive work and are socially constructed. 
Global emotions can be likened to Damasio’s (1999) notion of feeling of feelings; in this 
sense, we construe them as reflecting the person’s (i.e., organism’s) overall response to success 
or failure at the exchange task. Global emotions are special classes of reinforcement and 
punishment, being internal and correlated with neurological processes. They are primary 
motivational forces, relatively diffuse and ambiguous, but when activated, they organize 
interaction and generate cognitive work to interpret and understand where the feelings come 
from (i.e., what external objects or events cause them). This cognitive work is tied to actors’ 
efforts to repeat their experiences of positive emotions (an internal reinforcement) and avoid a 
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repeat of their experiences of negative emotions (an internal punishment). Specific emotions 
directed at social objects in the situation are a result of these cognitive interpretations. 
 
Emotions and Social Objects 
 
Whereas global emotions emerge from task activity, specific emotions are directed at 
social objects. Table 13.1 contains a classification scheme that identifies a specific emotion for 
each of the four objects of import in a social exchange context: task, self, other, and social unit. 
Self and other face an exchange task in the context of one or more social units (relation, network, 
and group). Pleasantness/unpleasantness is the overarching global emotion, generated by success 
or failure at the exchange task. The idea here is that success at the joint task generates an 
“emotional buzz,” whereas failure generates an “emotional down.” Lawler and Yoon (1996) 
distinguished two variants of global emotions—pleasure/dissatisfaction and 
interest/excitement—which were designed in part to correspond to the two primary dimensions 
of the circumplex model (pleasure and arousal). The sense of comfort from satisfaction is more 
“backward looking,” and the sense of anticipation from interest/excitement is more “forward 
looking.” 
The specific emotions take different forms, contingent on the object perceived as causing 
the global feelings. If global positive feelings are attributed to self, the specific emotion is pride; 
if global positive feelings are attributed to the other, the specific emotion is gratitude. In a 
parallel way, if global negative emotions are attributed to self, the specific emotion is shame; if 
global negative emotions are attributed to the other, the specific emotion is anger. The emotions 
associated with the social unit are affective attachment or detachment. If positive emotions 
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(global or specific) are attributed to the social unit, the affective attachment to that unit is 
increased; if negative emotions are attributed to the social unit, affective detachment is increased. 
These six emotions and the associated objects represent distinct interpretations for pleasant or 
unpleasant feelings (i.e., feeling good, feeling bad). To the extent that the social unit is perceived 
as the context for or source of positive emotions and feelings, it becomes an object of value in its 
own right, and actors are inclined to engage in collectively oriented behavior (e.g., staying in the 
social unit despite equal or better alternatives, giving rewards to others unilaterally and without 
strings attached, and cooperating in a social dilemma). 
There are alternative explanations for such collectively oriented behavior that reflect the 
different microfoundations for social exchange. A rational-choice interpretation is that the 
relation or group becomes a part of the actor’s utility function. A reinforcement explanation is 
that the relation or group becomes a discriminative stimulus, learned through repeated 
experiences within that group. A third interpretation is that the relation or group becomes an 
expressive object, symbolic of an affiliation with others, and an important source of social or 
personal identity (Collins 1981; Lawler 2001, 2003). These interpretations are not contradictory. 
All three processes could generate stable relations and groups in a complementary way. These 
alternative explanations reflect different ways an emotional/affective process can contribute to 
explanations of how and when social exchange generates social order. 
 
 
Insert Figure 3 Here 
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We argue, therefore, that the attribution of emotion to social units is central to 
understanding how social formations develop and are sustained by social exchange. However, 
the focus of attribution theory and research in psychology is on inferences about individuals 
from those individuals’ behavior (Jones and Davis 1965; Kelley 1967; Weiner 1986). Social 
units are not viewed as possible objects of attribution. The key comparison is between internal or 
dispositional attributions and situational or external attributions of the individual’s behavior. Our 
theory indicates that social unit attributions are possible and particularly important when 
individuals are engaged in a joint task such as social exchange. 
A key finding and principle of attribution research—namely that attributions are self- 
serving—suggests that social unit attributions are likely to be uncommon and rare. Individuals 
are prone to give themselves credit for success at a task and blame others or the situation for task 
failure, regardless of interdependencies or task jointness. The premises of social exchange theory 
(i.e., actors are self-interested and instrumental) resonate with this attribution principle. From 
standard exchange theory notions, one would expect actors to credit self primarily when they 
succeed at the exchange task and blame the partner or situation when they fail. With reference to 
the emotions in Table 13.1, pride in self and anger toward the other would be more common in 
social exchange than shame in self and gratitude toward the other. In the next subsection, we 
theorize conditions under which the jointness of exchange promotes jointness of responsibility 
and a sharing of credit/blame for success/failure at exchange. 
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Theoretical Assumptions 
 
The assumptions of our theorizing capture many of the underlying themes in the above 
discussion. Specifically, there are five assumptions (see Lawler 2001:327): First, social exchange 
produces global emotions and feelings (along a positive or negative dimension). Second, global 
emotions constitute immediate, internal, reinforcing or punishing stimuli. Third, given 
reinforcement and rational choice principles, actors strive to reproduce positive emotions and 
avoid negative emotions. Fourth, global emotions from exchange trigger cognitive work to 
identify the sources (causes) of global emotions and feelings. Fifth, actors interpret and explain 
their emotions partly with reference to social units (e.g., relations, groups, networks) within 
which the emotions are felt. 
The first two assumptions indicate that social exchanges generate global feelings and that 
these are special classes of reinforcement and punishment. The third and fourth assumptions 
portray global emotions as motivational forces (Izard 1991). When activated, they unleash 
cognitive efforts to interpret where they come from, with the potential sources being self, other, 
and the social unit. The fifth assumption indicates that in the context of joint tasks, actors 
interpret global emotions as produced in part by social units, and this is the foundation for 
stronger or weaker affective attachments to those units (e.g., relations, groups, networks, 
organizations). These assumptions flesh out the reasons for the modifications of the standard 
exchange theory position portrayed in Figure 13.2 (i.e., the addition of an exchange-to-emotion 
link and an emotion-to-group link). 
Next, we present two theories that are informed by the above emotions framework and 
assumptions: relational cohesion theory (Lawler and Yoon 1996; Thye, Yoon, and Lawler 2002) 
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and the affect theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001). Some of the above theoretical 
assumptions (especially the second and fifth) were implicit and undeveloped when relational 
cohesion theory was formulated and tested (see Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998). The affect theory 
of exchange (Lawler 2001) made these assumptions explicit and jumped off from the fifth 
assumption. Relational cohesion theory addresses the question of how and when power 
dependencies produce relational or group commitments through an emotional/affective process. 
The affect theory of social exchange develops broader principles for analyzing structural 
conditions under which actors attribute their emotions to social units and, therefore, develop 
stronger person-to-unit ties and greater group solidarity. 
 
RELATIONAL COHESION THEORY 
 
Exchange is historically a theory about both transactions and relations. Exchange 
theories explain patterns of social interaction and relations in terms of transactions (i.e., the flow 
of benefits between actors); transactions are explained in terms of the relations or networks 
within which these are embedded (Emerson 1972b, 1981; Wilier 1999). Emerson (1981), in fact, 
defined an “exchange relation” as a pattern of repetitive transactions among the same actors over 
time. He posited further that dyadic exchanges must be understood in the context of networks of 
exchange opportunities. Three or more interconnected actors are the minimal theoretical unit of 
analysis for Emerson. In the vast body of research on exchange networks over the past 20 years, 
repetitive or frequent exchange among the same pairs of actors is generally assumed; what is 
problematic is the division of payoffs. Thus, the development or strength of exchange 
relationships has received relatively scant attention, with the exception of more recent theory and 
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research on commitment and trust (Buskens 2002; Cook and Emerson 1984; Kollock 1994; 
Molm 2003a). 
Relational cohesion theory changes the emphasis of theorizing. First, the “fact” of 
exchange (frequency) is conceptually and empirically distinguished from the nature of exchange 
(i.e., the division of profits) and is important in its own right. Second, the key problematic is 
reaching agreement in exchange and, thus, the primary dependent variable is repetitive exchange 
(frequency). Third, exchange frequencies are construed as the principal basis for the formation 
and resiliency of exchange relations (Collins 1981; Homans 1950). Fourth, the focus is on when 
people become committed to their relation. Commitment is defined as an attachment to a social 
unit (i.e., relation, group, organization, community, or society) (Kanter 1968). The standard 
exchange theory explanation for commitment is uncertainty reduction or trust; that is, repeated 
exchange with the same partners makes them more predictable and, potentially, more 
trustworthy. Reduced uncertainty or increased trust generates a “bias” toward exchanging with 
the same partners one has successfully exchanged with in the past (Buskens 2002; Cook 2001; 
Kollock 1994; Molm 2003b). Relational cohesion theory proposes an emotional/affective 
explanation for such commitment. The theory is intended to complement, not displace, 
uncertainty reduction explanations (Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998). 
Relational cohesion theory developed from a line of theory and research on power 
dependence in bargaining and negotiation (Bacharach and Lawler 1981). That work 
distinguished zero-sum and nonzero dimensions of power, capturing these with concepts of 
relative and total power. Relative power is the comparison of each actor’s power in a relationship 
vis-a-vis the other (the zero-sum dimension), and total power refers to the sum or average of both 
actors’ power in the relation. Power dependence theory (Emerson 1972b) implies that both 
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dimensions are important because mutual dependencies or interdependencies in a relationship 
can vary, as can the distribution of power across actors. Total power captures an integrative 
dimension of power (i.e., an aspect of power that promotes collaboration, cooperation, and 
cohesion). With this integrative dimension of power, it is a short step to posing the questions: 
Will some power dependence conditions promote relational commitments more than others and 
through what process might this occur? These questions motivated the development of relational 
cohesion theory. 
 
 
Insert Figure 4 Here 
 
 
 
The theoretical model in Figure 13.3 captures the main ideas of relational cohesion 
theory. The overall message is that exogenous structural power (dependence) conditions generate 
relational commitments indirectly through an endogenous process. Emotions are central to that 
process. The two power dependence dimensions include relative power (equal-unequal) and total 
(average) power in the relation (Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Molm 1987). Higher total power 
reflects greater interdependence, and equal power reduces the problems posed by equity and 
justice issues in the exchange process. These power conditions determine the frequencies of 
exchange in any given dyad. The core of the theory is the endogenous process, the exchange-to-
emotion-to- cohesion sequence in the model that indirectly links structural power to behavioral 
commitment. Specifically, more frequent exchange generates (global) positive emotions and 
feelings, and positive emotions, in turn, produce cohesion (i.e., the perception that the relation is 
a unifying force in the situation). The result is various forms of commitment behavior: staying in 
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the relation despite equal or better alternatives, providing benefits unilaterally and without 
explicit expectations or contingencies, undertaking new ventures in the context of a social 
dilemma and therefore the potential for malfeasance. 
 
Empirical Evidence on Relational Cohesion Theory 
 
Evidence bearing on the emotional mechanism of relational cohesion theory actually 
predates the theory’s 1996 original publication date. In 1993, Lawler and Yoon published 
experiments designed to evaluate the impact of agreement frequency on positive emotions and 
commitment. These experiments involved two actors who could negotiate with one another 
under various conditions of power and exchange. In each condition, one individual was 
attempting to buy both iron ore and zinc from another individual who supplied these resources. 
Thus, the issues at stake were simply the price of iron ore and the price of zinc. The subjects 
occupied separate rooms, and each was instructed to maximize his or her benefit in the relation. 
In the event that subjects could not reach an agreement on one of the issues, each subject 
automatically earned some level of profit from a “standing alternative partner” that was in fact a 
simulated other. 
The primary independent variables were power/dependence (equal versus unequal) and 
the type of bargaining (integrative versus distributive). Power/dependence was manipulated by 
varying whether the amount of profit available from the standing alternative partner was the 
same for both partners (equal power) or not (unequal power). The kind of bargaining was 
manipulated by varying whether the two products, ore and zinc, were worth the same to both 
individuals (distributive) or different, which would make trade-offs possible (integrative). At 
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issue is whether or not conditions of equal power and integrative bargaining produce higher 
agreement frequency, positive emotions, and commitment behavior (i.e., gift giving and staying 
in the focal relationship despite exit options). 
The results of the experiment affirm the importance of emotions in producing 
commitment. Under conditions of equal relative power and integrative bargaining, subjects were 
more likely to reach agreement with one another. In turn, agreement frequency was significantly 
related to interest/excitement though not related to pleasure/satisfaction (the nonfinding for plea- 
sure/satisfaction has rarely occurred since this investigation). Finally, the data verify that positive 
emotion in the form of interest/excitement indeed predicted commitment behavior (both staying 
in the relation despite alternatives and gift giving). Overall, this was the first published evidence 
in support of the linkage among exchange frequency, positive emotion, and commitment 
behavior. 
In 1996, Lawler and Yoon published the first tests designed specifically to evaluate the 
theory of relational cohesion, as portrayed by Figure 13.3. This project entailed three distinct 
experiments, each addressing a different form of commitment behavior (i.e., gift giving, stay 
behavior, and contribution to a joint venture involving a two-party social dilemma). As before, 
all sessions involved two subjects who negotiated exchange from separate rooms, each 
attempting to buy some resource possessed by the other. In accord with Figure 13.3, the 
experiment manipulated conditions of total power (high versus low) and relative power (equal 
verses unequal). The experimental setting simulated negotiations across a number of “years” or 
episodes. At select points in the study, as specified by the theoretical model (Figure 13.3), 
measures of key concepts were taken. These measures included (a) agreement frequency, (b) 
positive emotions in the form of interest/excitement and pleasure/satisfaction, (c) relational 
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cohesion, and (d) commitment behavior. The temporal sequence specified by the theory was 
created in the experimental context, and the research tested the set of relations predicted by the 
model. 
The results of the study provided strong and consistent support for the theory (Lawler and 
Yoon 1996). Conditions of high total power and equal relative power tended to produced more 
frequent agreement between the individuals. In turn, frequent exchange had a positive direct 
effect on both pleasure/satisfaction and interest/excitement, as predicted. Also, as predicted, 
positive emotions had a positive direct effect on relational cohesion. Finally, there was uniform 
support for the notion that relational cohesion is the proximate cause of commitment. In fact, 
with all variables in the model included (see Figure 13.3), relational cohesion was the strongest 
and most significant predictor across all three forms of commitment—stay behavior, gift giving, 
and contribution to a joint venture. The theory makes strong claims about the sequence of 
indirect steps through which structural power conditions promote commitment, and these were 
confirmed at each step by the research. 
There is an interesting affinity between our findings on positive emotion and the broader 
sociology of emotions literature. The theory of relational cohesion focuses explicitly on two 
dimensions of positive emotion: pleasure/satisfaction and interest/excitement. Empirically, 
Lawler and Yoon’s 1996 study showed that both dimensions have direct positive effects on 
relational cohesion when each emotion was included as the sole predictor of relational cohesion. 
However, when both emotions were included simultaneously to predict relational cohesion, only 
pleasure/satisfaction was significant. Since then, pleasure/satisfaction consistently has played a 
stronger role in predicting relational cohesion (Lawler et al. 2000; Lawler and Yoon 1998). This 
pattern might suggest that pleasure/satisfaction is a more prominent emotion flowing from 
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exchange. In fact, pleasure/satisfaction was treated as one of four “primary” emotions by 
Kemper (1987), a distinction that is echoed in Turner’s (2002) scheme of basic emotions and by 
psychologists (Ekman and Freisen 1975; see also Stets 2003). In the context of these theories and 
their evidentiary basis, the fact that pleasure/satisfaction plays a stronger role may reflect its 
more “basic” or fundamental nature. 
To summarize, the theory and research on relational cohesion identify an endogenous 
process through which structures of dependence affect relational commitments. This process 
begins with the frequency of exchange; the second step is the occurrence of positive emotions, 
and the third is a perception of the relation as a cohesive object. These three moments are tied 
together, forming a conceptual unit. By implication, a structural condition that changes the 
frequency of exchange should correspondingly change the strength of this endogenous process; 
moreover, a structural condition under which exchanges do not produce positive emotions should 
inhibit or prevent the process from operating, and if the emotions experienced are not attributed 
in part to the relation, they will not generate perceptions of cohesion. This conceptual unit can be 
used to understand how relations within a network (or the same relation over time) stabilize to 
produce social order at the microlevel. 
 
EXTENSIONS OF RELATIONAL COHESION THEORY 
 
Since the basic series of tests in 1996, several other projects have sought to expand the 
basic theory and scope of application. Here we review two lines of work. First, in 1998, Lawler 
and Yoon studied whether dyads embedded in a larger social network would become committed 
to one another. Whereas previous work explicitly focused on a single dyadic exchange relation, 
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the move to “network embedded” dyads broadened the scope of the theory and forged deeper 
connections to other branches of exchange theory (e.g., Cook and Emerson 1978; Cook et al. 
1983; Markovsky et al. 1988) and to social identity theory (Rabbie and Horowitz 1988; Tajfel 
and Turner 1979, 1986). The question was whether “pockets of relational cohesion” would 
develop in exchange networks, particularly for dyads that have the highest frequency of 
exchange. Pockets of cohesion should fragment the network. 
This extension dealt with dyadic-level commitments in two networks: the branch and the 
stem (see Figure 13.4). In the Figure 13.4 networks, each letter represents a person and each line 
represents an exchange relation. When each position can make only one exchange per round, the 
branch is a strong-power network because A can never be excluded while two of the more 
peripheral actors (B, G, or D) always are. This causes the low-power actors to make increasingly 
favorable offers to A to avoid exclusion, and as such, the central actor enjoys large profit 
advantages over time. Overall, the branch can be seen as a network consisting of three dyadic 
relations (A-B, A-G, and A-D) in which A has a relative power advantage. 
 
 
Insert Figure 5 Here 
 
 
In contrast, the stem is a weak-power network because no single individual must be 
excluded (Markovsky et al. 1993; Thye et al. 1997). Weak-power networks are characterized by 
more moderate profit differentiation. Studies show that the stem tends to “break” into two 
distinct exchange relations: an equal power dyad (B-G) and an unequal power dyad (A-D). Thus, 
the stem represents a network that contains both equal and unequal relative power dyads 
embedded in the same social context; thus, relational cohesion predicts a pocket of cohesion in 
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the structurally equal power relation. At issue is how network-based power in each network 
alters the relational cohesion process. 
A second aim in this project was to determine how the relational cohesion process is 
affected by an overarching group identity. Research in the identity tradition finds that when 
social identities are activated in a group context, a variety of pro-social behaviors are likely to 
ensue. For instance, individuals sharing a common group identity are more likely to be 
cooperative, collectively oriented, altruistic, and responsive to group goals rather than to purely 
egoistic ones. Relational cohesion in dyads should be weaker if actors in a network share a 
common group identity and, by implication, so should the network-fragmentation effects. In the 
branch network, an overarching group identity should reduce exploitation by the central, 
powerful actor. 
Lawler and Yoon (1998) tested these ideas using four experimental conditions in which 
subjects negotiate exchange in either the branch or stem network, with or without a common 
group identity. The theory predicts that all relations in the branch will be used with equal 
frequency and, thus, no differences in cohesion and commitment should occur. However, 
exchange in the B-G relation of the stem was predicted to occur with greater frequency than A-
D. The more frequent exchange along B-G should, according to the chain logic of relational 
cohesion theory, produce greater positive emotion, stronger relational cohesion, and higher 
behavioral commitment relative to A-D. To implement this idea, in half of the experimental 
sessions the members of the network were portrayed as “departments” within a larger 
organization. In the other half, the participants were simply told that they were competitors with 
an interest in trading with others (Lawler and Yoon 1998). 
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The results support the theory. First, there were no differences in exchange frequencies 
across any dyadic relations in the strong-power branch. However, when the members of the 
branch shared an exogenous group identity, profit taking by the central actor was reduced. Thus, 
as predicted, it appears that a common group identity may induce more pro-social behavior. With 
respect to the stem, as predicted, actors in the equal power B-G relation reached agreement more 
frequently than actors in the unequal power A-D relation. Further, actors in B-G experience 
greater pleasure/satisfaction, interest/excitement, and relational cohesion compared to the actors 
in the A-D relation; that is, the endogenous process operated more strongly for the equal power 
dyad (B-G) than for the unequal power dyad (A-D), and these effects were not weaker when 
network actors shared a group identity. Further analysis of A-D showed that the endogenous 
process breaks down at the very first moment or step in the theory: Frequent exchange did not 
produce positive emotions. This affirms the importance of the exchange-to-emotion process that 
is central to the theory (see Figure 13.3). 
The next significant development in the relational cohesion research program came 2 
years later, with a project that simultaneously expanded the theory along two fronts (Lawler et al. 
2000). First, the theory was tested in a new productive exchange context. Productive exchange is 
one of four basic forms of exchange identified by exchange theorists (Emerson 1981; Molm and 
Cook 1995). The other forms include negotiated, reciprocal, and generalized exchange (see 
below for details). The second contribution of this research was to compare empirically the 
emotional- affective process of relational cohesion theory to an uncertainty reduction process 
(Lawler et al. 2000). The traditional exchange theory explanation for commitment is that 
frequent exchanges reduce uncertainty (Cook and Emerson 1984); that is, actors who exchange 
frequently should learn more about one another, come to find one another’s behavior more 
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predictable, and come to learn that they are similarly oriented to the exchange (Cook and 
Emerson 1984; Emerson 1981; Kollock 1994, 1999). Building on this idea, we expanded the 
relational cohesion model to test whether uncertainty reduction is a distinct, yet complementary, 
pathway to commitment vis-a-vis emotion. In other words, we incorporated uncertainty 
reduction in the theoretical model (Figure 13.3) as a second intervening pathway leading from 
exchange to cohesion. 
The two endogenous paths reflect different phenomena. The frequency-to-emotion-to- 
cohesion pathway reflects a social bonding process. The positive emotion from frequent 
exchange can be construed as “rewards” generated by the exchange and completion of joint 
activity. As such, actors should strive to reproduce these rewards and also think about their 
proximate causes. To the extent that the group is perceived as a cause of the positive emotional 
experience, the group itself should come to take on expressive value in its own right (Tyler 1990, 
1994). In contrast, the frequency-to-uncertainty reduction-to-cohesion pathway can be construed 
as a boundary-defining process wherein exchange partners become salient, distinctive, and set 
off relative to other potential partners. Social identity theorists frequently use this term to 
describe in-group versus out-group distinctions, and we adopt their terminology. At issue was 
whether the two processes were complementary explanations or if one had greater explanatory 
power. 
A modification to the basic experimental setting was required to create a productive 
exchange context. Here, three actors faced a task in which they could produce greater joint 
benefits if they all collaborated than if they operated alone or worked with another group. The 
exchanges were structured such that (a) actors in this context were deciding whether to engage in 
a single collaborative effort that would produce a pool of joint profit; (b) for an exchange to be 
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consummated, all actors had to agree to the exchange; (c) the exchange would allocate the pool 
of profits across actors; and (d) offers were made simultaneously and independently, which 
posed significant coordination problems. Overall, joint collaboration produced profits at the 
group level (actor-to-group flow of benefits) that benefited each of the actors (group-to-actor 
flow of benefits). 
As with earlier tests, structural power conditions were manipulated by varying the 
relative (equal versus unequal) and total (high versus low) dependence of each member on the 
group (see Lawler et al. 2000), and dependence was operationalized as the quality (expected 
value) of a fixed outside offer that could be accepted in the event that the focal group did not 
reach agreement. Under these conditions, subjects exchanged for a total of 16 episodes. At select 
points, measures were taken of exchange frequency, positive emotion, predictability, and 
relational cohesion. Additionally, two kinds of commitment behavior were studied. After episode 
13, subjects could either give one another small token gifts as a symbol of their relationship (i.e., 
gifts of small pieces of candy) or they could invest some of their earnings in a new joint venture 
that involves considerable risk but could provide substantial benefits (i.e., investment in a three-
person prisoner’s dilemma game). 
Overall, the data clearly support the relational cohesion theory account of commitment in 
exchange. First, as predicted, the data indicate that structural power conditions significantly 
impact exchange frequency. Under conditions of high total dependence (i.e., the expected payoff 
from the alternative group is smaller than the expected payoff from the focal group) and equal 
relative dependence (i.e., the expected payoff from the alternative group is the same for each 
member of the focal group), more exchanges were consummated in the three-actor setting. In 
turn, frequent social exchange had a significant direct effect on both positive emotion and 
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uncertainty reduction (i.e., predictability). These findings are important because they replicate 
and further verify the emotional effects of frequent exchange, and they support the hypothesis 
that exchange also generates uncertainty reduction or predictability. The latter finding is 
consistent with standard exchange-theoretic explanations for commitment and supportive 
empirical tests (e.g., see Kollock 1994).  
The next step in the causal chain suggests that both uncertainty reduction and positive 
emotion increase perceptions of group cohesion. The results indicate that positive emotion has a 
significant effect on perceptions of group cohesion, as hypothesized, but uncertainty reduction 
does not. In short, it seems that when both theoretical constructs are included to predict the 
development of cohesion, positive emotion simply carries more explanatory power. This does 
not necessarily mean that uncertainty reduction is unimportant, but whatever impact it has on 
commitment is operating through paths separate from perceptions of cohesion. In short, the 
emotional affective process at the core of relational cohesion theory receives significant support. 
The role of uncertainty reduction is clarified below. 
Finally, the theory predicts that group cohesion is the proximate cause of gift giving and 
contributions to a social dilemma—our measures of commitment. The results for this prediction 
are mixed, but, interestingly, help clarify the unresolved role of uncertainty reduction. Consistent 
with virtually all research in the relational-cohesion program, perceived cohesion had a 
significant effect on gift giving. However, group cohesion did not significantly affect the 
propensity of actors to invest in a new venture (i.e., cooperate in the social dilemma). In previous 
work on dyads, relational cohesion effects have been found for this form of commitment 
behavior (Lawler and Yoon 1996). The difference could be due to the fact that the obstacles to 
cooperation are known to be more difficult in a three-person prisoners’ dilemma than in a two-
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person prisoners’ dilemma. The addition of a third person heightens uncertainty and makes trust 
more difficult for actors under these conditions. At the outset of the project, we anticipated that 
this would make it even more likely that uncertainty reduction would be related, directly or 
indirectly, to this form of commitment behavior. Given that the indirect relationship was not 
observed, we suspected that a direct relationship might be present. 
To investigate this, we changed the original theoretical model to include several new 
pathways suggested by prior theory and by our data. The results revealed a direct effect of 
perceived predictability on the investment form of commitment. Thus, uncertainty reduction 
does operate in the productive exchange context, but not in the way that we originally theorized. 
It is important to note that this alternative pathway to commitment can be interpreted in terms of 
trust. Trust is defined as the expectation of cooperation by others (Pruitt and Kimmel 1977) and 
is one of the best predictors of whether and how individuals resolve social dilemmas (Axelrod 
1984; Kollock 1994, 1999; Komorita and Parks 1996; Yamagishi 1986). To be trusted, one must 
first be predictable, so in this regard, predictability can be construed as a necessary (though not 
sufficient) condition for the emergence of trust. If so, we should observe a direct relationship 
between predictability and investment, as we did. 
To summarize, this project suggests that dual processes operate to produce commitment 
behavior. The data indicate that emotional affective and uncertainty reduction mechanisms 
promote different forms of commitment behavior. Of particular importance for relational 
cohesion theory is that the emotional/affective process operates as a separate and independent 
mediating process leading to commitment behavior. Other processes such as uncertainty 
reduction, trust, and norm formation have been emphasized in research on exchange, contracting, 
and social dilemmas (e.g., Cook and Emerson 1984; Macy and Skvoretz 1998; Williamson 1981; 
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Yamagishi 1986). Relational cohesion theory, with its emphasis on the emotional-affective 
consequences of exchange, provides explanatory power above and beyond these alternative 
approaches. 
 
AFFECT THEORY OF SOCIAL EXCHANGE 
 
The affect theory of social exchange proposes that the jointness of the exchange task 
determines whether actors perceive the social unit as a source of global emotions (Lawler 2001). 
The main idea is that individuals attribute their individually felt emotions to their relation or 
group affiliation if the task is high in jointness. The jointness of the tasks likely varies, 
objectively and subjectively. For example, an organization may define the tasks of a work group 
in individual or joint terms and, in the process, highlight individual or collective responsibility 
for the results. A series of objectively individual tasks may be defined in more joint or collective 
terms within an overarching organizational framework. Both the objective task conditions and 
the subjective definitions put forth are important. To concisely address this issue, the affect 
theory of social exchange proposes a fundamental structural (objective) and cognitive 
(subjective) condition for social unit attributions. 
The structural dimension is the degree that individual contributions to task success (or 
failure) are separable (distinguishable) or nonseparable (indistinguishable). This contrast is from 
Williamson’s (1985:245-247) analysis of work structures. He argued that, in a work setting, 
when contributions are nonseparable, employees cannot assign individual credit or blame to one 
another for work group success or failure; such task jointness generates “relational teams” as a 
governing mechanism. Relational teams are structures of informal control that develop if the 
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shared responsibility for group success is more salient to employees than their individual 
responsibility. The affect theory of social exchange adopts this as a fundamental principle for 
analyzing how social structures shape individual emotions and their consequences for relations, 
groups, and networks. Implied here is an underlying macro-to-micro and micro-to-macro process 
(Lawler 2002). 
The cognitive dimension of jointness is the degree to which the exchange task promotes 
the sharing of responsibility for success at exchange. Our argument is that if exchange generates 
a sense of shared responsibility, actors are more likely to interpret their individual feelings as 
jointly produced in concert with others and, therefore, more likely to attribute those feelings to 
relationships with those others or to common group affiliations. Thus, if employees perceive a 
shared responsibility for group performance, a work group should generate greater emotion- 
based cohesion, group commitment, and group solidarity. Overall, additive tasks strengthen the 
sense of individual responsibility, whereas conjunctive tasks strengthen the sense of shared 
responsibility. Discrete, specialized, independent roles draw attention to individual 
responsibility; whereas overlapping, collaborative roles highlight shared responsibility (see 
Lawler 2003). The theory suggests an emotional affective explanation for the fact that systems of 
accountability that “target” individual performance have different consequences for group-level 
collaboration than systems of accountability that “target” group performance. 
Based on the above reasoning, the core propositions of the affect theory of social 
exchange (Lawler 2001) are as follows: 
 
Core Proposition I: The greater the nonseparability of individuals’ impact on task 
success or failure, the greater the perception of shared responsibility. 
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Core Proposition 2: The greater the perception of shared responsibility for success or 
failure at a joint task, the more inclined actors are to attribute resulting global and 
specific emotions to social units. 
 
The key implication is that a sense of shared responsibility generates relational or group 
attributions of emotion and these, in turn, foster stronger person-to-social-unit affective 
attachments. In addition, these core propositions imply particular relationships among the 
specific emotions (see Table 13.1). To the degree that individuals attribute their emotions to joint 
activities, they can both feel pride in self and gratitude toward the other (e.g., “When we get 
together, good things happen).” Giving gratitude to the other does not reduce the sense of pride 
or vice versa. If failure occurs in this context, individuals feel anger toward the other but also 
shame in self; thus, each emotion moderates the other, which is a potential basis for a collective 
response to failure. On the other hand, if members of a work group attribute positive emotions to 
their own individual contributions, they feel pride in self but little gratitude toward others, 
reducing cohesion or solidarity effects (e.g., “I did most of the work and made this happen”). If 
they fail at a group task, they may direct anger toward others and direct little shame at self (e.g., 
“They didn’t do their part”). 
In sum, the sign of the relationships among specific emotions is determined by the 
relative weight or strength of social unit and self-serving attributions. Social unit attributions 
generate positive relationships between self-other emotions, whereas individual attributions 
generate negative relationships. In the context of joint tasks and social unit attributions, positive 
experiences (task success) would have an even stronger effect on cohesion and group 
commitment than otherwise, whereas negative experiences (task failure) would have a less 
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detrimental effect on cohesion and group commitment. Applying the theory’s above core 
propositions, social unit attributions are most likely to occur when the structure of exchange 
entails high nonseparability and fosters a strong sense of shared responsibility. Social structures 
determine whether social exchanges entail nonseparability and, therefore, are likely to generate a 
sense of shared responsibility. The core propositions should apply to any structural dimension 
that varies the degree that individual efforts and contributions are nonseparable (Williamson 
1985). 
To date, the affect theory of social exchange has focused on two structural dimensions: 
the form of social exchange between actors and the network connections between exchange pairs. 
The structural form of exchange refers to the way that the behaviors of individuals are 
interconnected (e.g., negotiated versus reciprocal exchange). Network connections refer to the 
connections between different dyadic exchanges or prospective relations in a network (e.g., 
positively or negatively connected). These are basic structures in the social exchange tradition 
(e.g., Molm and Cook 1995). Theoretical predictions for each are detailed below. 
 
Structural Forms of Exchange 
 
There are four structural forms of exchange and two types of network connection 
analyzed in the original formulation of the affect theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001).The 
forms of exchange are as follows: productive, negotiated, reciprocal, and generalized (Emerson 
1981; Molm 1994; Molm and Cook 1995). Productive exchange is a context in which actors 
coordinate their behaviors to generate a joint, private good. Examples are a business partnership 
or co-authors on a paper or book. Negotiated exchange is a context in which actors form an 
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explicit agreement that specifies the terms of a trade (i.e., who gives and receives what and how 
much). Reciprocal exchange involves sequential giving of rewards (unilaterally), essentially 
becoming interconnected and expected over time. Finally, generalized exchange occurs when 
actors give and receive benefits from different partners. Overall, productive exchange is person 
to group, whereas negotiated and reciprocal exchanges are direct, person to person. Generalized 
exchange has been termed indirect and impersonal (Emerson 1981; Molm and Cook 1995). The 
analysis of the theory (see Lawler 2001) indicate that the degree of jointness varies across these 
four forms of exchange as follows: productive > negotiated > reciprocal > generalized. 
Thus, the theory makes the following predictions for forms of exchange: 
 
Prediction 1: Productive exchange generates stronger perceptions of shared responsibility 
and stronger global emotions than direct or generalized exchange. 
Prediction 2: Direct exchange produces stronger perceptions of shared responsibility and 
stronger global emotions than generalized exchange. 
 
Given the above predictions and core propositions; 
 
Prediction 3: The strength of person-to-group attachments (solidarity) is ordered as 
follows across forms of social exchange: 
productive > negotiated > reciprocal > generalized 
Prediction 4: Direct exchange structures—negotiated and reciprocal-—generate stronger 
dyadic relations than group relations, whereas productive or generalized exchange 
generates stronger group relations than dyadic relations. 
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Prediction 1 is based on the fact that productive exchange is the most cooperative and 
group-oriented exchange structure. Each of the other structures has mixed motive interests or a 
significant trust problem. Prediction 2 assumes that in direct exchange relations, the person-to- 
person feature enables actors to solve trust problems more readily than generalized exchange. 
This proposition contradicts Ekeh’s (1974) idea that generalized exchange generates the greatest 
group solidarity, but we argue that Ekeh’s prediction assumes an already existing group (see 
Lawler 2001:339). Generalized exchange entails a high separation of individual “contributions” 
and 0ceteris paribus) generates lower shared responsibility and affectively based solidarity; at 
the same time, the solidarity that does occur will be at the group level, as prediction 4 indicates. 
Prediction 3 stems from the notion that shared responsibility promotes relational or group 
attributions of emotion. Prediction 4 is based on the notion that, in direct relations, emotion is 
attributed to the exchange relation, whereas in productive or generalized exchange, emotion is 
attributed to the network or group. 
 
Types of Network Connection 
 
Emerson (1972b) distinguished two types of connection: positive and negative. Assume a 
four- actor box network—A, B, C, D—in which each actor can exchange with two of the others. 
If the network is positively connected, then an exchange between A and B increases the 
probability that A and B will also exchange with the others (C and D). If the network is 
negatively connected, an exchange between A and B excludes the possibility that A or B will 
exchange with any others. These two forms of connection involve different structural incentives 
to exchange with one or more partners in the network. 
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Wilier (1999) clarified and specified the incentives underlying different network 
connections by proposing a tripartite distinction among exclusive, inclusive, and null 
connections. Exclusive connections are similar to Emerson’s negative connections (i.e., an 
exchange of any two excludes exchange with others). Inclusive and null connections are two 
versions of what Emerson would term “positive connections.” With inclusive connections, all 
exchanges that are possible must be completed in order for any given exchange to yield rewards 
for partners. Thus, in the four-actor box network, all possible exchanges in the network would 
have to occur in order for an exchange between A and B to yield benefits. A “null” connection 
signifies that there is no prior relation between exchange in one relation and exchange in another; 
transactions in the two relations are independent. Actors have an incentive to exchange with as 
many others as possible in the network. If actors want to exchange with all others in an 
exclusively (negatively) connected network, they have to do it sequentially across transaction 
periods, but they have no structural incentive to do so. With a null connection, they can exchange 
within the same transaction period and, in fact, have an incentive to do so. The overall 
implication is that at the network level, the jointness of the exchange task is highest in an 
inclusively connected network and lowest in an exclusively connected network. A null-
connected network would be in between. This has important implications for the emotional 
effects of exchange and for the transformation of networks into tacit or explicit groups. 
The explanation for network-level effects is that emotions diffuse across relations in a 
network (Lawler, 2001, 2002, 2003; Markovsky and Lawler 1994). In a three-person network (A, 
B, C), if A feels good from an exchange with B and then enters an exchange with C, A’s positive 
feelings from A-B spread to the A-C interaction; if A feels bad from an exchange with B and 
then exchanges with C, A’s negative feelings spread. This assumption is plausible, given that 
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considerable psychological research on affect and mood shows that global, diffuse feelings (good 
or bad) from interaction with one person carry over to interaction with others, even if there is no 
connection or similarity between the situations or persons (Isen 1987). Moreover, those in a 
positive mood are likely to cooperate more, use more inclusive categories for others, take more 
risks, and employ heuristics in processing information (Bless 2000; Forgas 2000; Isen 1987). 
Because positively connected networks promote exchanges with as many others as structurally 
possible, positive emotions in each relation reinforce and strengthen those in other relations. The 
main implications are as follows: 
 
Prediction 5: In positively connected exchange networks, dyadic exchanges generate 
group formation at the network level and strengthen affective attachments to this unit; 
in negatively connected networks, exchanges in dyads generate the pockets of 
cohesion in exchange relations and strengthen affective attachments to the relation 
rather than the network or group. 
Prediction 6: Cohesion and solidarity at the network level will be ordered as follows 
across the three types of network connection: inclusive > null > exclusive. 
 
Evidence Bearing on the Affect Theory 
 
To date there are no direct tests of the affect theory, although we are currently in the 
process of collecting experimental data that will do just that. Even so, there are a number of 
theoretical and empirical studies that bear on the underlying logic of the theory. For example, the 
affect theory indicates that structural conditions that give actors a sense of shared responsibility 
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for the collective result should trigger positive emotions and person-to-group attachments. The 
most immediate unit in any two-party exchange is the relation itself, but insofar as there is 
common activity and experience across interdependent dyads in a broader network, the emotions 
should make salient the group attachments across the entire network. Thus, the theory has 
implications for when individuals comprising an exchange network come to view themselves as 
members of a common group and behave with regard for one another. 
One recent study took up the question of when and how networks of individual agents 
come to see themselves as belonging to a common group and behave in pro-social ways (Thye 
and Lawler 1999). We have developed a concept of network cohesion that captures two such 
network conditions: (a) the proportion of relations within a network that are equal in power and 
(b) the degree of relational density in the network (Thye and Lawler 1999). The main assertion is 
that exchange networks containing a high degree of equal power relations and many direct ties 
among actors will unleash the endogenous process of relational cohesion theory at the network 
level. As such, we predicted that individuals exchanging within highly connected networks 
composed of many equal power relations should be more likely to sense a common experience 
and shared responsibility with the others, even if they interact and exchange with select partners. 
The results of this new study were supportive. In networks with high network cohesion, dyadic 
exchanges generate positive feelings, and these promote group formation at the network level. 
From the perspective of the affect theory, the underlying reason is that such networks promote a 
sense of common experience, interdependence, and a corresponding sense of shared 
responsibility. 
In terms of the strength of person-to-group attachments, recall that the affect theory 
orders the four forms of exchange as follows: productive > negotiated > reciprocal > generalized. 
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This stands in contrast to Ekeh’s (1974) theory, which asserts that generalized exchange is a 
fundamental basis for social order at the macrolevel because it creates obligations to the larger 
collectivity. Ekeh argued that in systems of generalized exchange, wherein individuals are 
unilaterally giving to (and reaping benefits from) others in the system, trust is likely to emerge 
and become normative. Trust, as such, should encourage pro-social behavior and regulate the 
temptation to act out of self-interest. However, as Lawler (2001) noted, Ekeh’s analysis centered 
more on the consequences of generalized exchange provided that it has emerged and is part of 
the normative context. The affect theory focuses more on the fact that generalized exchange 
entails distinct individual contributions and, thus, is fragile. As such, the theory predicts that it is 
less likely to have the emotional consequences of direct exchange and promote perceptions of 
shared responsibility. 
On a related note, the order specified for negotiated versus reciprocal exchange is 
controversial (see Molm 2003a). An argument can be made that commitment and cohesion, all 
else being equal, will be greater in reciprocal rather than negotiated exchange because reciprocal 
exchange involves greater risk and a more serious trust problem (Molm 2003a, 2003b). The issue 
of risk and trust in reciprocal exchange comes down to the following: When one actor gives 
unilaterally, he or she has no assurance that the other will reciprocate. Negotiated exchange 
typically involves binding agreements, which, by definition, resolve the trust problem and 
minimize risk. The key obstacle in negotiated exchange is to balance ones motive to profit 
against the fear of being excluded. Experiments by Molm et al. (1999) have found that reciprocal 
exchange produces more positive affect directed at the exchange partner and more commitment 
to that partner relative to negotiated exchange. 
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However, it should be noted that prediction 3 of the affect theory is based solely on the 
presumption that jointness is more salient in negotiated than in reciprocal exchange. Our focus is 
on the development of person-to-unit affective attachments, which we believe are theoretically 
driven by jointness of task and perceptions of shared responsibility. In contrast, Molm and 
colleagues (1999) have theorized and studied person-to-person processes involving the 
development of trust, risk aversion, and perceptions of fairness. Molm has shown empirically 
that these processes operate differentially across negotiated and reciprocal exchange contexts 
and, thus, clarifies some of the theoretical differences across these forms of exchange (see Molm, 
2003b, for a review). In short, the two theoretical research programs address different conceptual 
and empirical issues. Taken together, they offer complementary perspectives that promise to 
illuminate important differences across these (and other) forms of exchange. 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Since the early 1950s, with rare exception, the actors of traditional social exchange 
theory have been portrayed as calculating and unemotional beings. The emphasis has been on 
theorizing purely instrumental actors that are either backward looking agents driven by 
environmental reinforcement schedules or forward looking agents who rationally calculate the 
potential to maximize gains and avoid losses. Our research program introduces a new kind of 
social actor: one who interacts with others lodged in a social structure, experiences and seeks to 
understand her or his emotional reactions, and attributes these emotions to self, other, or the 
larger social unit. The primary aim is to understand how, in the latter case, exchange processes 
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trigger emotions and attributions that render dyads, networks, and groups as expressive objects 
of value. 
Over time, our theoretical research program has evolved from one concerned with dyadic 
encounters (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996) to a broader emphasis on exchange within social 
networks (Lawler and Yoon 1998) and fundamental links to the varieties of social exchange and 
the nature of commitment (Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2000). In many regards, the research 
program is a textbook example of cumulative theory growth in that the questions and problems 
addressed by the program today emerged directly from those of yesterday. Although we have 
made substantial progress in understanding the emotional underpinnings of commitment and 
solidarity, there are a number of questions that still remain. In closing, we review some of the 
general implications of our work and how these connect to broader literature. 
A recurrent theme in our research is that people experience emotions from accomplishing 
or not accomplishing an exchange task, and these trigger efforts to understand the emotions. We 
agree with Hochschild (1979) that emotions are involuntary reactions that simply “happen to 
people,” but what is most important is not that emotions happen, but to what they are attributed 
(i.e., task, self, other, or social unit). Our research calls attention to the fact that under certain 
exchange conditions, positive emotions will be attributed to the social unit, resulting in affective 
attachment to that unit. The forms of exchange most likely to produce affective attachments are 
those in which the task success is not clearly attributed to one actor or the other but, instead, to 
the joint activity, and perceptions of shared responsibility are high. 
The emotional processes at the center of our research are distinct, yet complementary, to 
the rational-choice and behavioral orientations that are fundamental to exchange theory. Our 
research has implications for the relationship of social exchange and social order, even when 
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such order seemingly contradicts otherwise rational action. To illustrate, consider combat units in 
the armed services that depend on social order among rank-and-file soldiers to effectively 
implement military strategies. Social order, in this context, depends on individual soldiers who 
obey commands, even when those commands fly in the face of their immediate self-interest (i.e., 
advancing on the enemy when there is some probability that you yourself could be shot). Our 
theory and research program suggests that order will be established and maintained to the extent 
individual soldiers possess strong affective ties to social units (i.e., company, brigade) in which 
they frequently interact and exchange items of value. If strong enough, such ties regulate self-
interest and provide a common emotional/affective basis for coordinated social action (see also 
Collins 1989). From our work, this is most likely to occur when task success depends on the 
existence of joint activities for which there are perceptions of shared responsibility. 
In closing, the theoretical research program reviewed here uniquely emphasizes the role 
of emotions in social exchange and focuses on the processes through which social structures 
strengthen or weaken affective attachments to relations, networks, and groups. In comparison to 
other exchange-based theories, our work brings together the rational and emotional consequences 
of social interaction. The incentives lodged within social structures provide rational incentives 
for agents to interact and exchange with one another so that they can jointly accomplish tasks 
that are otherwise unobtainable. However, such interaction carries emotional consequences, and 
these determine when individuals come to see the relation, network, or group as an expressive 
object of value in its own right. Implicit in this approach is that micro social encounters create 
affective ties to more macrounits (i.e., groups, networks, communities), which, in turn, provide a 
basis for solidarity, stability, and social order. 
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